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3Abstract
This working paper offers a perspective on contem-
porary debates about state-formation, contributing to 
ongoing thinking about the role of conflict and speci-
fically civil war in the emergence of different kinds of 
political orders.
 Based on a reconceptualization of the likely na-
ture of the linkages between civil war and political or-
der, the working paper develops a set of potential cau-
sal pathways linking common conditions of civil war 
to likely wartime changes in the political settlement 
and state institutions. In doing so, it aims to provide 
an organising framework for future research to explore 
conditions under which different pathways predomina-
te and aims to offer an analytical tool to policy makers 
and researchers to consider potential impacts and 
consequences of violent conflict in contexts of con-
cern. 
1
Introduction
4
At the beginning of the 21st century, there was an established policy consen-
sus that violent conflict was both a cause and consequence of state weak-
ness, failure and disintegration. Much of this policy-focused literature built  
on earlier academic explorations of changes in the international economy, 
technologies of violence, and the norm of sovereignty, all of which seemed to 
suggest that “war in the contemporary developing world tends to trigger […] 
dismantling and even a  criminalisation of [state] administrative structures” 
(Leander, 2004, p. 74; see also: Bayart et al., 1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 
Cooper, 2002; Duffield, 2001; Herbst, 2004; Jung, 2003; Kaldor, 2013, 1999, 
Reno, 2002a, 1998). By contrast, two more recent strands of research have 
called into question a simple antithesis between violent conflict and state 
weakness. 
 The first of these strands has seen a deeper engagement with the 
actually occurring historical trajectories of state formation. Making effective 
use of the insights of Charles Tilly (Tilly, 1992, 1985, 1975), this literature has 
placed the ‘violence problem’ at the centre of state-formation logics and 
processes (North et al., 2013, 2009), to explore ways in which certain forms of 
violence ground political order (e.g. Giustozzi, 2011a), and to investigate how 
institutions change and adapt in crisis settings (Di John, 2010a; Giustozzi, 
2011b; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2009; Putzel and Di John, 2009); complicating a simple 
antithesis between violence and the institutional forms and innovations we 
associate with the modern state.1 This literature has stressed that in addition 
to the fragmentation and ‘state failure’ associated with internal violence, 
there are situations in which “statemaking and what we now call ‘internal war’ 
are two sides of the same coin,” since state formation implies moves to reduce 
the autonomy and rule-making ability, access to violence, and fiscal and other 
resources of non-state actors, which are likely to meet fierce resistance 
(Ayoob, 1998; compare also: Giustozzi, 2011a; Schlichte, 2007; Skocpol, 2008).
 The second strand of literature has begun exploring the complexity of 
the political orders generated in contexts of civil war at a much more local 
level, highlighting that while conflict often fragments political order, it can 
provide the framework for a wide variety of sometimes highly sophisticated 
institutions (Arjona, 2014, 2011; Mampilly, 2007). Research on the micro level 
impact of violent conflict on political institutions has demonstrated the need 
to explore the (micro-)politics of civil war and the multiple competing pro-
cesses that impact on the character and durability of institutions in contexts 
of war and conflict. Different kinds of institutional change can and are pro-
moted by processes of armed violence (e.g. Justino et al., 2013).
 Starting from these recent insights, the paper offers a reconceptualiza-
tion of the likely linkages between civil war and state formation. It argues that 
the centrality of violence, particularly internal violence, for the establishment 
and reproduction of political order has not been taken seriously enough and as 
a result civil war has been unproblematically equated with state collapse and 
unmaking, even though its impact is likely to be far more complex and contin-
gent. Building on the questions highlighted by this conceptual shift, the paper 
 1 This is a view with much older roots, which 
has recently had to be re-discovered 
(compare e.g. Maleševic, 2010 on the 
connections between war-making and 
state-making in classical sociological 
thought). Moreover, it was on the forefront 
of thinking about the state in Europe at the 
beginning of the 20th century, whether on 
the left - as in Walter Benjamin’s (1966) 
critique of violence - or in fascist theori-
zing, such as Carl Schmitt’s (1979) analysis 
of the ‘state of exception.’ Indeed, Max 
Weber can also be read in this way (Weber, 
1980, pp. 815, 822).
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develops a set of potential causal pathways linking common conditions of civil 
war to likely wartime changes in the political settlement and state institu-
tions; based on a wide reading of the existing literature. Seeking in relatively 
simple, abstracted form to set-out a complex and at times contradictory set of 
linkages, the processes presented here necessarily abstract from the specifi-
cities of domestic institutions, historical rivalries, and time- and place-bound 
types of knowledge.  
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Core Concepts
2.1. The State and Political Settlements
Attempts to theorise the state in the field of peace and conflict studies have 
tended to focus on crises of the state in parts of the global South; crises that 
have typically been conceptualised as state collapse, fragility, or weakness 
(Herbst, 2004; Milliken, 2003; Patrick, 2006; Rotberg, 2004; Zartman, 1995). 
Implicitly or explicitly, this literature shares a vision of the state as the sup-
plier of rights and public goods and as the arena of peaceful democratic and 
market-based competition - it defines the state in terms of a set of functions 
and determines whether states are strong or weak based on some aggregation 
of measures of these functions.2  
 Where this notion of the state is made explicit, we are offered lists of 
state functions – to supply public goods, provide social welfare, encourage 
civility, or give citizens the right to vote – whether codified as ten (Ghani and 
Lockhart, 2008) or a more compact four such functions (Levi, 2002; Zürcher, 
2007).
 Arguably, this literature is characterised by serious confusion between 
the concept of state weakness and its consequences3 and, more broadly, is 
orientated towards externally imposed criteria and suppresses power, politics 
and history. The analysis relies on categories that are “subjective, arbitrary 
and externally imposed”, to borrow from Kriger’s assessment of peacebuilding 
criteria (Kriger, 2003, pp. 11, 15); for the functions of the state are derived from 
a particular historical notion of the state, which itself has always been some-
thing of an idealisation. Indeed, for decades after Weber formulated his 
thoughts on the state, even in the most powerful states, the legitimate use  
of force was not only exercised, but successfully claimed, by party and private 
militias, vigilantes, and private security and detective companies.4  
 When approaching the state from the perspective of functions, practical 
difficulties, surrounding the choice of indicators, conceptual clarity, quality  
of data, and issues of aggregation, abound (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2009).5 These are 
accompanied by major theoretical difficulties. Thinking about the state in 
terms of functions by its nature requires a (normative) theory of what states 
should do, an account of the boundaries between the state and society, and a 
theory of how the state should be doing the things states are supposed to do. 
None of these are unproblematic, as the ‘third wave’ of state theorising has 
underscored (see e.g. Jessop, 2001; Migdal, 2001; Mitchell, 1991). Moreover, 
such thinking about the state is blind to the identity of powerful actors and 
the very different political orders implied by different dominant coalitions.
 What might an alternative perspective look like? There has been a 
marked convergence in recent work in political economy (Cramer, 2006; 
Cramer and Goodhand, 2003; Putzel and Di John, 2009), institutional econom-
ics (Khan, 2007; North et al., 2013, 2009) and parts of sociology interested in 
 2 Cullen Hendrix (2010) provides a useful 
overview of different measures and what 
they may be capturing. 
3 For instance, Bob Jessop (2001, p. 164) has 
pointed to the tautology involved in defi-
ning weakness or strength purely in terms 
of outcomes, whereby strong states are 
ones that are able to do the things strong 
states do.
4 It is also worth noting that, “the state-
centred and state-supporting literature 
of political science has been so heavily 
concerned with emphasizing the benefits 
of statehood that the other side of the ac-
count has gone almost unnoticed (…). The 
social costs of statehood, and particularly 
of modern statehood, include the sacrifice 
of identities and structures that are inimi-
cal to the hierarchies of control that states 
seek to impose” (Clapham, 2004, p. 86; see 
also: Scott, 1998).
5 Gutierrez highlights that coding and ran-
king state performance run into two types 
of problems: issues such as poor concep-
tual definition, conceptual dispersion, 
inconsistencies, and confusion between 
causes and definitions, which he deems 
serious, but potentially solvable, and those 
he argues are shared with practically all 
cross-national contemporary political 
science databases and which he judges 
as probably not solvable. On the specific 
point of indicators and their meaning, the 
example of tax to GDP ratio is instructive. 
It is a frequently used and clearly impor-
tant political economy variable (compare 
e.g. Di John, 2010a). However, not only is it 
uncritically utilised as a proxy for a broad 
range of weakly-linked indicators, but it is 
also unclear what we can infer about the 
relative ‘strength’ of the state from the fact 
that, for example, Algeria, Lesotho, and 
Sweden all had average tax/GDP values 
near 31% between 1980 and 2000 (Hen-
drix, 2010, p. 279).
7long-term historical trajectories (Mann, 2012, 1993, 1986, Tilly, 1992, 1985, 
1975), offering a view of the state and state-formation focusing on conflict, 
power and violence, rather than state functions. Indeed, it views such func-
tions almost as by-products. These works all share an interest in the historical 
processes by which actually existing states have been formed and (1) stress 
how specific groups and powerful social actors use the coercive capacities of 
the state for their benefit, (2) view the forms and institutions of the state as a 
product of significant and ongoing conflict for political, economic and cultural 
power6, and (3) recognise the centrality of violence for contesting, establishing 
and reproducing the state.
 A promising way to capture these insights lies in the conceptual vocabu-
lary of the political settlement (Khan, 2010; Putzel and Di John, 2009) or 
dominant coalition (North et al., 2013, 2009). This approach stresses that any 
political order is based on an agreement between groups with access to 
violence, particularly those that could bring down the existing order were they 
to revolt. Together, these groups, whose alliance is at the heart of state power, 
are the dominant coalition. The implicit or explicit agreement governing the 
allocation of obligations and rights (to violence, property, political influence 
and dispute resolution) to the dominant coalition is the political settlement. 
This settlement reflects the underlying political economy, for the powerful 
interests that make up the dominant coalition and their (imperfect) control  
of coercion and capital determine whose interests are reflected in laws and 
state practice. Although often stable for long periods, any political settlement 
is subject to recurrent renegotiation, in which external shocks or gradually-
accruing changes in bargaining power can lead to (sudden) shifts in the 
settlement.
 For all the utility of thinking about the state in this way, there is a danger 
of throwing out the baby of institutions with the bathwater of a narrow focus 
on state functions. The tendency of the political settlement literature to treat 
institutions primarily as epiphenomena of more or less inclusive coalitions 
underestimates institutions’ durability and the way they generate new inter-
ests and even social groups, thus creating path dependencies, altering the 
political settlement in turn and constraining the range of options open to the 
dominant coalition and others (Hall and Taylor 1996).
 Moreover, there is a danger in an exclusive focus on the political settle-
ment of losing sight of the questions that motivated the thinking about the 
links between conflict and political order in the first instance: making sense of 
tendencies of fragmentation and cohesion,. centralisation and de-centralisa-
tion, routinisation , formalisation and informalisation; as well as links between 
political settlements, institutions and developmental and state-formation 
outcomes.  
 For this reason, the working paper proposes to view the political settle-
ment in tandem with institutional changes, i.e. shifts in organisations, rules, 
formal and informal procedures, functionaries, and bureaucrats that embody 
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 6 In the words of Douglass North (1990, pp. 
260–261), (state) institutions are created 
“to serve the interest of those with bargai-
ning power to create new rules”
8 7 Those familiar with Peter Hall’s (1997) 
analysis of institutional development may 
find it useful to think about the political 
settlement in terms of ‘interests,’ and 
the institutional expression of the state 
in terms of ‘institutions’. Or, in the terms 
of Kahlevi Holsti’s (1996, p. 97) thinking 
about the state, the ‘physical basis’ of the 
state and its ‘institutional expression.’ The 
third item in both of these authors’ trinity 
of explanation, ideas, doubtlessly help 
determine which of the rival pathways 
identified in section three are pursued by 
actors, but this dimension is not explored 
further below. 
8 These studies have consistently found 
that civil war weakens states measured in 
terms of the ratio of tax to GDP. However, 
findings have not always been statistically 
significant and suffer from major short-
comings in terms of construct validity and 
data quality. They have not engaged with 
evidence from studies of civil war onset 
that coding decisions about civil war can 
have substantial impacts on findings 
(Sambanis, 2004), with evidence that GDP 
data is highly unreliable (Jerven, 2013), 
or with arguments that missing data may 
be systematically absent: “For it is in 
the nature of things that [the quality of] 
state-performance information is directly 
proportional to the level of development 
and the strength of the state” (Gutiérrez 
Sanín, 2009, p. 9).
9 This has become a common theme of work 
focusing on the micro-dynamics of conflict 
at least since Kalyvas’ (2006) important 
contribution. Compare i.a. the collection in 
(Justino et al., 2013).
10 While there is no obvious boundary bet-
ween civil war and related phenomena 
such as smaller-scale insurgencies, less 
contentious organised crime, or less vio-
lent mass protests and direct action - and 
important political struggles occur over 
the naming of actually existing instances 
of contention - there is much to be said 
for viewing them as distinct, but related 
phenomena. In important ways, political 
violence is not simply a continuation of 
non-violent contentious politics by other 
means, for “if and when violent means on 
both sides begin to predominate, mobili-
sation, rivalries, and defensive action all 
spiral rapidly upward” (Rogers, 2011, p. 
51).
the state in practice and provide both its organisational form and the officials 
who conceive of themselves as its agents. This perspective allows us to 
conceive of the state as both a system of domination and its incarnation in 
rules and patterned behaviours, characterised by an historical process of 
state-formation and ongoing conflict.7  
2.2. Civil War
The other core concept of this paper is civil war and the mechanisms and 
processes that may characterise it. Too often, thinking about civil war and 
particularly about the connections between civil war and the state has 
engaged in little to no analysis of what civil war is and what may characterise 
phenomena labelled in this way.
 One reason why this is so important is because of a tendency in the 
literature on the impact of civil war on the state to investigate the state-mak-
ing and state-breaking effects of civil war through large-n quantitative ‘test-
ing’ (e.g. Chowdhury and Murshed, 2014; Lu and Thies, 2013; Thies, 2005).8   
This literature fails to take the possibility seriously that because civil wars are 
messy and complex things, there may be multiple competing and contradic-
tory causal pathways linking civil wars to outcomes in terms of political order. 
Yet, this is almost certainly the case, for when students of civil war have 
explored their object conceptually, they have tended to stress civil war as one 
among a range of forms of violence and collective action, itself composed of a 
wide variety of different behaviours and practices  (e.g. Cramer, 2006; Kalyvas, 
2003). That is to say, there is great diversity both between different instances 
of what we refer to as civil wars and between what happens in different places 
and to different (types of) people within any given such conflict.9 
 If this is true, the average effects of ‘civil war’ on ‘the state’ become a 
great deal less interesting because there is underlying variation. One way of 
capturing this insight is to view civil war as a form of violent claim making and 
collective action sharing features with other forms of contentious politics. In 
this view, civil war is collective contentious action exhibiting high levels of 
coordination and in which violent coercion is the main way in which power is 
exercised and contested – that is, the ‘salience of violence’ is high (Tilly, 
2003).10   
 Such an approach to civil war readily acknowledges the wide diversity  
of causes, consequences, forms and objectives at work in the group of events 
and processes we call civil war. It can also deal with the fact that civil war, as  
a form of contention, is always about challenging the status quo: Insurgents 
claim to fight to establish or maintain a more just order for some fraction of 
the population (Jung, 2003, p. 15). In this sense, it is unlikely that civil war has 
a single effect on the institutions of the state and the dominant coalitions that 
emerge from conflict. The status quo and the alternative being offered matter: 
What is being contested, by whom, against whom, and how. Insurgent aims, 
Core Concepts
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degrees of success, wartime institutional developments by both incumbents 
and insurgents, and the peace agreements that end conflict, to name but a 
handful of important factors, shape the nature of the political order that 
emerges.11    
 However, such a definition also highlights the fact that civil war is likely 
to exhibit important similarities at the meso-level (Tarrow and Tilly, 2007; Tilly, 
2003). This is because as a form of highly coordinated collective action in 
which the salience of violence is high, civil war requires the articulation of a 
challenge to the status quo and thus (1) reveals the existence of rivals to the 
dominant coalition. In addition, as a form of contention in which violent 
coercion is the main way in which power is exercised and contested, (2) civil 
war increases the salience of violence for contestation and rule maintenance. 
Finally, because of widespread coordinated violence for control of territory, 
population, and/or resources, (3) civil war re-draws zones of control, with 
far-reaching implications for strategies of rule maintenance. Overlying these 
processes, the violence, death and destruction of war itself is liable to cast a 
long shadow.12  
 That we can construct such a list of common processes operational 
during civil war highlights that such wars, or rather the practices that com-
pose them, are likely to influence the state in systematic ways. As we will see 
in the following, it is a way to think about the impact of civil war on the state 
that can help to get beyond an impasse in the literature, that, even in its most 
sophisticated versions, has concluded (doubtlessly correctly) that there is “no 
single unambiguous causal relation between states and wars” (Schlichte, 
2003, p. 38), but has left it at that.13 
 11 Such an approach may also instil a sensib-
le scepticism about the various efforts to 
pin down precise and consistent defini-
tions and coding rules for a civil war (c.f. 
Cramer, 2006).
12 Viewing civil wars in this way also alerts 
us to dangers of reification and glorifica-
tion that have accompanied war-making 
since its inception, in the sense that it is 
only one form - and often a destructive 
and ineffective one - of claim making and 
collective action. At the same time, view-
ing civil war as a set of processes within a 
continuum of political violence and coll-
ective action highlights its political nature 
and cautions against the similarly reifying 
demonization of any violent challenge to 
the status quo of authors equating civil 
war with development in reverse and the 
unmaking of states.
13 Viewing civil war in this way also suggests 
that these different processes are what we 
should be interested in - only in a second 
instance does this then mean thinking 
about systematic variation between dif-
ferent configurations of civil war on them. 
While there is some evidence that ethnic 
and non-ethnic civil wars follow different 
logics (Cederman et al., 2013; Doyle and 
Sambanis, 2000; Sambanis, 2001), that 
secessionist conflicts, rebellions, and 
coups likely include differential dynamics 
and may be made more likely by different 
factors, (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Kaly-
vas, 2005; Le Billon, 2001), and external 
intervention can impact on and interna-
tionalise ‘domestic’  civil war in complex 
ways, thinking of civil war as a form of con-
tention with recurrent features and shared 
processes, means that these themselves 
may offer the richest opportunities for 
disaggregation.
10
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The Proposed Processes
 14 With its focus on mechanisms, this paper 
takes an approach inspired by process 
tracing. It seeks to set out a potential 
“causal chain […] between an independent 
variable (or variables) and the outcome 
of the dependent variable” (George and 
Bennett, 2004, pp. 206–207; compare 
also: Gerring, 2007, p. 45). Process tracing 
implies a ‘mechanismic’ ontology, that is a 
belief that statements of causality can go 
beyond statements of regular conjunction 
(Sayer, 1992).
15 Different conditions of warfare may be one 
important factor influencing choices over 
mobilising. According to Gongora, (1997), 
the importance of advanced weapons 
in interstate conflict has underwritten 
a strong preference among dominant 
coalitions for large-scale external support 
since the second half of the 1950s in the 
Middle East in order to access advanced 
technologies of violence. In this sense, civil 
war, which is often characterised by less 
technology-intensive warfare, may be one 
of the few forms of contemporary warfare 
in which seeking such forms of external 
support is not a strongly dominant strate-
gy.
The above discussion suggests civil war is marked by three widely recurring 
features. It (1) reveals the existence of rivals to the dominant coalition; (2) 
increases the salience of violence for contestation and rule maintenance; and 
(3) redraws social and spatial zones of control, with far-reaching implications 
for strategies of rule maintenance and access to resources. These three 
recurrent features are likely to affect the two dimensions of the state identi-
fied above: the political settlement and its institutional expression. This 
section spells out the potential mechanisms14 by which they appear to be 
connected.
3.1. Effects on the Political Settlement
The mechanisms linking features of civil war to the political settlement are 
summarised in Figure 1. They begin from the three recurring features of civil 
war identified in the previous section.
 Revealing the existence of rivals to the dominant coalition, civil war both 
creates and reflects an elite crisis. On the one hand, there is a great deal of 
evidence suggesting that civil wars tend to arise under conditions of renego-
tiation or crisis of the political settlement (Giustozzi, 2011a; Skocpol, 1979); on 
the other, war and civil war generally open up “new arenas of conflict, bargain-
ing and accommodation” between elites (Heydemann, 2000, p. 17). As a result, 
it often translates into conflict between and defection of elements of the 
coalition, resulting in rapid shifts in power and in the composition of the 
dominant coalition itself. Moreover, since war marks intensive periods of 
primitive accumulation (Cramer, 2006) and extreme returns on investment  
are possible for entrepreneurs that are willing to take the exorbitant risks of 
operating under conditions of war and/or serve the needs of (successful) 
violence specialists (Cramer and Goodhand, 2003), civil war tends to create 
stark winners and losers among economic actors, thereby again re-drawing 
the membership of the dominant coalition. 
 Second, increases in the salience of violence for rule maintenance mean 
that the dominant coalition has an increased need for violence, which it can 
meet by mobilising existing violence specialists, by creating new security 
organisations, or by seeking external allies. The process outlined in Figure 1, 
below, suggests that each has a different effect on the political settlement, 
since access to violence decisively determines the distribution of the material 
benefits and opportunities offered by war (Raeymaekers, 2013).15  
 If members of the dominant coalition seek predominantly to build 
alliances with existing local violence specialists, this is likely to lead to a 
decentralisation of power over coercion, since it usually involves giving up 
large amounts of central oversight (Giustozzi, 2011a, p. 63) and requires the 
transfer of rights, including rights to revenue extraction, and of control over 
resources to local violence specialists from the centre to buy loyalty. Moreo-
ver, as Joel Migdal (2001, p. 68) has argued, powerful local intermediaries tend 
to undermine conditions for centralising control of coercion in the longer term, 
11
since they make the creation of effective central militaries more difficult. 
Indeed, while ‘taming’ violence may make sense viewed from the capital, 
violence and brinkmanship are often tools for local violence specialists to 
increase their leverage vis a vis the centre (Giustozzi, 2009, p. 13).
 Such a dynamic appears to have been operational during the civil war  
in Yemen in the 1960s. The conflict between the ‘royalists’ and ‘republicans’, 
generated an escalating bidding war to secure the support of armed tribes for 
the rival sides. This generated a veritable flood of guns and money for tribes  
in the country’s north, greatly expanding their power and underwriting an 
extensive process of involuntary decentralisation (Dresch, 2000; Rogers, 
forthcoming). Similarly, in Sierra Leone, regime support and arming of the 
Kamajors, Mende hunters that increasingly replaced the disintegrating 
military, while successful in stabilizing most Mende areas of Sierra Leone, 
coincided with and accelerated the disintegration of the military and 
expanded the autonomy of these areas (Arnold, 2008).
 By contrast, successful attempts to create new organisations - to 
mobilise and organise new capabilities for coercion, especially where such 
organisations mobilise new constituencies and are designed to address the 
continued need for selective violence in a context where targeting is increas-
ingly difficult - are likely to extend central patronage networks and draw new 
groups into the political settlement, often, but not necessarily, strengthening 
the security forces as the preferred conduit for such patronage.
 The centralising impetus of new coercive organisations stems from the 
fact that mobilising new constituencies often generates direct relationships 
between actors at the centre and various locales not mediated through local 
gatekeepers or strongmen. For example, in Algeria, militia mobilisation during 
the later years of the 1990s civil war drew on hitherto ‘neutral’ elements of the 
population, notably former fighters in the War of Independence and the young 
men who also provided one of the key constituencies of the armed Islamist 
groups. Creating these new militia groups appears to have succeeded in 
generating support for the central government and extending the reach of its 
patronage networks (Lowi, 2005, p. 235; Martinez, 2000, pp. 194–5). Similarly, 
in Peru “the arming of the rondas campesinas led to new ties between state 
agents and local indigenous residents in many highland communities despite 
previous state violence” (Wood, 2008, p. 545). This same counter-insurgency 
strategy gave greater power and autonomy to the armed forces (Mauceri, 
1997).
 However, the distinction between these two strategies - empowering 
local violence specialists vs. creating new organisations and mobilising new 
groups - may not always be clear-cut and many actual instances of mobilisa-
tion, whether by rebel groups or incumbents, are likely to combine elements  
of both. Moreover, the former strategy may masquerade as the latter, since 
institutionalising and centrally-recognising existing local violence specialists 
is often the easier strategy to pursue in practice, whereas the creation of new 
The Proposed Processes
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 16 It is worth noting that how soldiers and 
rebel fighters are recruited may be im-
portant in its own right. Some research 
suggests that ideological recruitment 
strategies result in more disciplined and 
centralised forces than monetary recruit-
ment strategies (Weinstein, 2007). Howe-
ver, the picture is likely to be significantly 
more complex (Guichaoua, 2013) and both 
strategies tend to coexist (Mampilly, 2011, 
p. 14).
17 Conversely, in situations where a con-
flict is based in a split of the military or 
a conflict’s master-cleavage is framed 
in terms of religious, ethnic, or linguistic 
identities, political loyalties and ascriptive 
identities may play a near-exclusive role in 
patterns of recruitment.
18 Not only, but perhaps especially, in an age 
of nationalism, legitimacy and local infor-
mation have been among the most elusive 
resources for external interveners and 
consequently among the most powerful 
bargaining chips for domestic actors.
19 As in the case of mobilisation strategies, 
incumbents and insurgents can and do 
pursue multiple financing strategies at 
time (Mampilly, 2011, p. 14), meaning more 
than one of these pathways may be active 
at once.
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organisations and the mobilisation of new constituencies often makes for 
better propaganda. In trying to disentangle the two, it may be helpful to 
enquire into the networks of political trust that predominate in purportedly 
‘new’ organisations and the extent to which local leaders control them. 
 In a related dynamic, the pressures of civil war and the need to increase 
selective violence can in some cases put a check on recruitment and organis-
ing strategies in the armed forces that exclusively prioritise political loyalty, 
creating incentives that favour institutionalisation and professionalization, 
and offering particular advantages to the military within the dominant coali-
tion (Giustozzi, 2011a, pp. 43–74).16 Direct threats, such as those presented by 
a civil war, are not sufficient to induce incumbents or insurgents to pursue 
such strategies, but they appear to be the only contexts in which the effec-
tiveness of the armed forces may trump coup-proofing and political loyalty 
(Finer, 1975). Although this dynamic is more frequently raised in the context  
of inter-state war, if we are thinking about civil wars in terms of collective 
contentious action exhibiting high levels of coordination and in which violent 
coercion is the main way in which power is exercised and contested, there is 
no a priori reason why a similar dynamic should not exist in such conflicts, 
provided they create situations of acute military danger to incumbents. These 
appear to be most likely to occur where both sides face a realistic chance of 
military success. 
 For instance, all three cases of ‘social revolution’ examined by Theda 
Skocpol in her seminal study of France, China and Russia, exhibited such a 
dynamic, as revolutionaries responded to intense internal and external threats 
by creating permanent, professional militaries, whose size and effectiveness 
were vastly extended (Skocpol, 1979). Similarly, during the latter stages of the 
royalist-republican civil war in Yemen, the republican leadership ceased 
political purges, relied on (ideologically) suspect commanders and volunteers, 
and armed and trained the inhabitants of Sanaa, the capital, during the 70-day 
“siege of Sanaa.” The measures appear to have been critical to the successful 
defence of the capital, but set the scene for newly empowered and ‘profes-
sionalised’ officers to attempt to force political change once the siege had 
been weathered (Burrowes, 1987, pp. 30–31).17 
 Finally, securing large-scale external military support or direct inter-
vention decisively shapes the parameters and incentives within which domes-
tic actors pursue strategies. This is by no means to suggest that external 
interveners tend to get their way, or to reduce complex domestic factors to a 
single variable of foreign intervention. However, external intervention tends to 
supply coercive capacities well in excess of those available by other strategies 
to those it supports. Often coupled with external funding, discussed below, it 
tends to provide superior technologies of violence that require a high level of 
technical expertise and thus tend to have a centralising effect - such as 
air-power or armoured vehicles - and provides opportunities for patronage. 
While on face of it, it may appear as though such external support should 
undermine local violence specialists and even domestic armed forces, these 
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are often central to external interveners as their recognised organisational 
counterparts and as suppliers of local knowledge.18 As a result, external 
intervention may be associated with both the decentralising and centralising 
dynamics discussed above. What it tends to add, however, is the resources 
necessary for sustaining a broad range of potential dominant coalitions not 
necessarily supported by the domestic political economy. It may incentivise 
the creation of narrow and unsustainable coalitions, due to interveners’ 
tendency to define some parties to the conflict as being beyond the pale and 
conditioning their continued support on their exclusion. 
 External intervention per se does not create unsustainable dominant 
coalitions, but by decisively shaping the domestic political economy, it can 
allow dominant coalitions to form, which are dependent on continuing external 
support for their survival; indeed, dependence is sometimes a stated goal.  
As a result, the political settlement in these contexts may be highly unstable 
when the parameters of external intervention change (Giustozzi, 2011a,  
p. 227). 
 Under such conditions, domestic political economies often become 
organised around the regional and international pursuit of strategic rents 
(Heydemann, 2000, p. 13) and other forms of capital and power accumulation 
that is ‘politically determined’ (Weber, 1980, pp. 95–97) by interveners. In this 
way, such interventions appear likely to generate an externally-orientated 
dominant coalition and may disadvantage the domestic holders of capital in 
particular, as external intervention generally provides domestic violence 
specialists with sophisticated weapons and funds without having to strike 
bargains with the domestic holders of capital.
 This process appears to have been operational in Yemen during the 
1960s, when Egyptian support for President al-Sallal enabled, indeed was 
conditioned on, the political exclusion of the more consensual figures of Abd 
al-Rahman al-Iryani and Ahmed Noman, who were central to bringing the 
conflict to a settlement after Egyptian withdrawal. Other potential examples 
of such a dynamic at work include post-invasion Iraq and Afghanistan in the 
2000s and Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s (compare i.a. Giustozzi, 
2009). As has become clear from the preceding discussion, the three pathways 
to mobilising violence specialists presented here - alliances with local vio-
lence specialists, recruitment of new constituencies, and gaining external 
intervention-need not be mutually exclusive, and we may find elements of all 
three - and consequently an activation of contradictory causal pathways - in 
any given situation. 
 Finally, the reconfiguration of zones of control under a large-scale 
violent challenge to incumbents means that under conditions of civil war, 
dominant coalitions lose access to domestic revenue, even as the cost of 
rule-maintenance increases. From the perspective of the political settlement, 
four potential reactions by dominant coalitions are particularly relevant.19 
14
The Proposed Processes
Figure 1: Effect of civil war on the political settlement
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 The first concerns gaining large-scale external financing. Like access to 
large-scale external coercion, this changes the parameters for the formation 
of a domestic dominant coalition. Where financing does not rely on bargains 
around taxation and bringing on board domestic holders of capital, there is 
greater variability in the potential composition of the dominant coalition, 
providing a context in which coalitions that are unsustainably narrow in 
domestic terms and must rely on continued access to external resources can 
emerge. Such external funding need not come from foreign governments. 
Other forms of rent, from natural resources or diaspora networks may also 
provide external funding, with each likely to condition potential insiders and 
outsiders in the dominant coalition in different ways. Overall, however, the 
availability of external financing appears likely to undermine the role of 
domestic capital in the wartime and post-war political settlement, while 
strengthening the position of the main actors in control of coercion. For, as 
foreign funding becomes central to deploying coercion and thus the survival  
of the dominant coalition, constituencies that gain bargaining power are those 
domestic actors that provide access to violence, as well as external donors. 
This weakens the bargaining power of domestic holders of capital and there-
fore cancels out incentives for (other) members of the dominant coalition to 
respond to their demands (Leander, 2004, pp. 72–6).20 
 Contrary to the contention of a number of authors, who have seen such 
external financing and especially access to global financial flows as a recent 
phenomenon or a feature of ‘new wars’ (i.a. Kaldor, 1999; Leander, 2004), this 
dynamic appears to have a longer pedigree. For example, Miguel Centeno 
(2002) argues that the availability of global financial flows to Latin American 
governments in the 19th century diminished their need to extract revenue 
from their citizens in order to finance wars. As a result, war-making in Latin 
America - both in terms of intra- and inter-state conflict -led to a different, 
more externally-orientated state-formation process than that analysed by 
Charles Tilly (1992) in Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries. 
 There are other ways in which both incumbents and challengers might 
react to a loss of revenue, even as the costs of control increase, most notably 
the fiscal innovations that have often accompanied the high capital require-
ments of war: printing money, expanding (government) borrowing, and domes-
tic resource mobilisation through taxation. Figure 1 suggests that strategies 
of money-creation, because of the inflationary pressures they cause, will tend 
to weaken the holders of capital within the dominant coalition. By contrast, 
strategies focusing on increasing domestic debt and borrowing likely empow-
ers them, since, all other things being equal, they gain influence as creditors. 
Both of these tendencies should not be over-stated.21  
 Likewise, additional resource mobilisation through taxation will tend to 
strengthen the holders of capital within the dominant coalition and often 
encourages a broadening of the coalition. Since taxation, to be successful, is 
reliant on at least the passive acquiescence of those paying taxes (Levi, 1988), 
expanding taxation requires bargaining and often the extension of rights and/
20 The distinction between groups whose po-
wer depends on capital and those whose 
power depends on coercion is analytically 
useful in thinking about different interests 
within the dominant coalition. It is also a 
simplification, in that power is fungible to 
an extent: capital can buy coercion and 
access to coercion can create lucrative 
markets in protection or enforce monopo-
lies, providing sources of capital.
21 Enormous profits can be made by the 
holders of capital through currency tra-
ding under conditions of (hyper)inflation 
(see e.g. Picard, 2000 on Lebanon), while 
conversely, leaders in control of coercion 
have often rid themselves of debts through 
threats or use of force against domestic 
creditors, pointing to the limits of control 
exercised through the purse alone.
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 22 Compare the useful discussion in Michael 
Ross’ (2004) exploration of this issue. 
Though his actual ‘testing’ of the impact 
of taxation on democratisation raises a 
number of issues about operationalisati-
on and data quality, the conclusion that 
citizens ultimately care about the ‘price’ 
they pay for the government services they 
receive fits comfortably with the notion of 
dominant coalition bargaining (rather than 
more formalistic or institution-focused 
views of democratisation).  
23 As a result, it has, ironically, often been 
rebel governance, long seen as anti-state, 
which has been most likely to attempt 
taxation strategies, which, in their more 
successful variants, have had to be rule-
bound and offer benefits for the taxed to 
be successful - though equating all forms 
of (rebel) governance with state-building 
or state formation appears fallacious 
(Arjona et al., 2015).
or other benefits to broader constituencies - an idea that can be found in a 
succession of influential thinking about state formation from Schumpeter to 
Michael Mann (1984), Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly, and Douglass North.22  
 Yet, while a small number of states did develop a taxation apparatus 
during the past century - often going hand-in-hand, as in India, with the sort of 
resistance, localised rebellion and bargaining we would expect - on the whole, 
incumbents weighing their options in the international political economy of 
the past century have pursued rents and revenues derived from control of 
international borders, rather than pursuing internal taxation during periods of 
civil war. Particularly for incumbents in post-colonial settings, who inherited 
institutions designed primarily for this purpose (Bayart, 1996; Bayart et al., 
1997; Cooper, 2002; Young, 1994), this has often been a favoured strategy.23  
As a result, post-independence incumbents and many of the insurgencies they 
face derive much of their income from natural resource extraction and inter-
national strategic alliances (Mampilly, 2011, pp. 69–72; Moore, 2004) - both 
sources of external funding in the terms of the schematic in Figure 1. Even 
where taxation has been a major source of income, much of it has come from 
levies on imports and exports, that is, from control of international borders, 
not from bargains with those inside a territory. It would appear that such 
income approximates the effects of external funding, as (some) rulers find 
that they can manage political networks without treasuries, extensive bureau-
cracies, or revenue collection, provided they monopolize commerce (Reno, 
2002a, p. 841).
3.2. Effects on Institutions
The second proposed set of linkages concerns causal pathways linking civil 
war to outcomes in terms of institutions, that is changes in organisations, 
rules, formal and informal procedures, functionaries, and bureaucrats. These 
linkages are summarised in Figure 2 below. They begin from the same, now 
familiar, three recurrent features of civil war as those marking the starting 
point of potential processes in Figure 1.
 Revealing the existence of alternatives to the incumbent, civil war 
reflects and provokes a crisis in the dominant coalition. This is likely, at least 
in the short term, to lead to a fragmentation of central control as the rump 
ruling coalition loses the resources – including violence specialists – provided 
by the defecting elements, weakening central control over violence and thus 
increasing the margin of manoeuvre of local strongmen and power brokers. 
Internal warfare fragments political authority (Kalyvas, 2006).
 In addition, the increased salience of violence for regime maintenance 
under conditions of civil war increases incumbents’ need for violence if they 
wish to remain in power. In response, they can empower local violence special-
ists or organise new constituencies for violence. This initial situation and the 
attendant choices are familiar from the discussion above.
The Proposed Processes
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 Figure 2 proposes that in terms of institutional change, empowering 
local violence specialists will tend to multiply competing local institutions and 
weaken central institutions for control of violence. Empowering local violence 
specialists may reflect deliberate outsourcing or fragmentation strategies to 
protect incumbents from military concentrations of power (Leander, 2004; 
Reno, 1998), reflect the absence of alternative options, or other constraints. 
 Such a dynamic will be familiar to students of the conflict in Sierra 
Leone, where, as discussed above, central support for local militia groups  
was associated with a disintegration of the army as a centralised institution 
(Arnold, 2008). Similarly, in his discussion of warlordism in Afghanistan, 
Antonio Giustozzi (2009) highlights the way in which attempts to recruit local 
violence specialists for counterinsurgency purposes fragmented control over 
violence in Afghanistan to such an extent that the emergence of a number of 
powerful local warlords actually represented gains in centralisation and local 
security. Similar dynamics appear to have been present in South Sudan (De 
Waal, 1994) and Tajikistan (Nourzhanov, 2005). As these examples serve to 
highlight, the fragmentation resulting from empowering local violence special-
ists often increases the incidence of violence, for in ‘markets’ of violence, the 
actors that provide ‘security’ are, paradoxically, in a position to increase 
demand for their services by creating insecurity (Elwert, 1997; Mehler, 2004). 
 Alternatively, incumbents and insurgents may organise or recruit new 
violence specialists. As discussed above, this will tend to favour more central-
ised control over coercion and the creation of more sophisticated security 
organisations, although there may be countervailing pressures, thereby 
decisively shaping the relationship of the centre to the peripheries.
 Centralisation of control over violence and professionalization of 
violence specialists appears to have been a feature of the United States’ civil 
war. Recruitment drives and the need to supply growing numbers of troops as 
the war unfolded, led to significant centralisation, as state-led purchasing, 
recruitment and command became increasingly supplanted by a national 
military and its attendant bureaucracies of conscription, procurement and 
supply, resulting in a durable shift of power from the states to the central 
government (Wilson, 2006). Similar dynamics appear to have been present in 
Rwanda, where the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) organised Tutsi refugees 
from a range of backgrounds into a hierarchical fighting force in the early 
1990s. The military victory of the RPF in the aftermath of the genocide and its 
existence in the initial post-conflict period as a centralised and powerful 
organisation appear to have been one of the key features structuring the 
creation of the current centralised, bureaucratic (and increasingly repressive) 
Rwandan institutional set-up (Straus and Waldorf, 2011). 
 In addition to the immediate impacts on institutions dealing in violence 
and on the degree of central control over violence rights, the examples high-
light that strategies focusing on the recruitment of new constituencies are 
liable to have important, albeit potentially contradictory impacts on state 
institutions not primarily about the administration of violence. 
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 24 To a certain extent, of course, the military 
and non-military are less distinct than 
this schematic suggests and there is an 
interrelation. Access to the means of vio-
lence can and is often used to accumulate 
fortunes, while accumulated capital allows 
the purchase of violence specialists, wea-
pons and other paraphernalia of coercion.
25 On the particular and often neglected is-
sue of food in war - its production, collec-
tion and distribution compare: Collingham 
(2013).
 On the one hand, stronger central institutions dealing in violence may 
weaken formal institutions not primarily concerned with the administration of 
coercion. This pathway emphasises the potential for military expenditure to 
crowd out other forms of state spending, as well as emphasising that in 
situations characterised by limited organisational capacity, a unified, profes-
sional military has often dominated other institutions and increases in per-
ceptions of risk translated into greater pre-eminence and social standing of 
the military. This appears to have occurred in a number of cases where inter-
nal and external threats may have combined to create particularly acute 
perceptions of risk, including in Pakistan and Algeria (Giustozzi, 2011b, p. 10; 
Grawert, 2016). In addition, stronger central institutions dealing in violence 
might lead to a hollowing-out of civilian forms of administration to the extent 
that areas are put under outright military rule or civilian administration more 
broadly is subordinated to the war effort and military institutions substitute 
for civilian ones (through military tribunals and administration, military-led 
construction of roads and infrastructure, etc.).24 To the extent that this path-
way is operational, the formation of more sophisticated military organisations 
would lead to a weakening of non-coercive institutions. 
 On the other hand, as the examples of the US civil war and the RPF in 
Rwanda from above highlight, more sophisticated security organisations can 
have the opposite effect, providing an organisational model and experience 
with large, centrally controlled hierarchical organisations as well as acting  
as a conduit for other forms of bureaucratic and hierarchical organisation.  
As Weber argued with reference to the European experience, the rule-bound 
behaviour and organisational discipline of the military can form the foundation 
for the civilian bureaucracy (Weber, 1980, pp. 681–6). In addition, mobilising, 
keeping track of, equipping, paying and otherwise managing new violence 
specialists may have significant linkages to other areas of bureaucratic 
organisation. This means that, as appears to have been the case with the 
Northern states in the civil-war-era United States of America, the creation  
of a large, more centralised military can create pressures for the creation of a 
range of similarly centralised bodies to organise everything from the growing 
of food,25 over the recruitment of soldiers, to overseeing industrial production 
(Wilson, 2006), thus driving selective bureaucratic expansion and penetration. 
In a related logic, Richard Stubbs describes a process whereby during the 
‘Malay Emergency,’ the government’s desire to control territories ‘cleared’  
of insurgents and to avoid their return, led incumbents to significantly expand 
the civil service at the local level and send government agents into areas 
where they had hitherto not been present (Stubbs, 1997, pp. 65–66). 
 Finally, the third common feature of civil wars in this framework, the 
redrawing of zones of control, is likely to have important consequences for 
institutional change. There is mounting evidence that the redrawing of zones 
of control, and particularly contestation of local control, reduces both central 
control and the ability locally to sustain complex institutions that provide 
public goods (Arjona, 2014). Combined with the increased costs of maintaining 
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effective control implied by a coordinated, violent challenge to the status quo, 
loss of central control over some areas, creates strong incentives for incum-
bents to seek additional sources of funding or to more aggressively exploit 
existing sources. Again, analogous to the choices presented in Section 3.1, 
incumbents as well as insurgents, face difficult choices between different 
strategies to raise funds. As in section 3.1 above, these options are primarily: 
gaining large-scale external financing, decentralising taxation to local power 
holders, printing money, expanding (government) borrowing, and mobilising 
domestic resources, generally via forms of taxation.
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Figure 2: Effect of civil war on institutions
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 Figure 2 suggests that the most important options from the perspective 
of institutional change are likely to be decentralising taxation to local power 
holders and expanding taxation to mobilise domestic resources. The other 
options, gaining large-scale external financing, printing money, and expanding 
(government) borrowing, do not appear to be systematically linked to institu-
tional change, although there may be linkages between them. In particular, 
external funding has often meant that donor preferences, via conditionality, 
affect institutions and procedures in (unintended) ways; and there is a litera-
ture on de-institutionalisation as a response to the availability of external 
financial flows (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Reno, 2002b, 1998).26 
 As we saw in section 3.1 above, decentralising taxation often accompa-
nies strategies to decentralise control over violence rights, as the transfer of 
rights, including rights to revenue extraction, is usually necessary to buy 
loyalty where the centre gives up control over coercion. Historically, different 
variations of feudal models approximate such a system. More recently, the 
examples of Yemen and Sierra Leone, discussed above, come to mind.  
If members of the dominant coalition, or insurgents, seek predominantly to 
build alliances with existing local violence specialists, this is likely to weaken 
central institutions and non-coercive institutions in particular. Thus, for 
instance, the reliance on tribal fighters during the civil war in Yemen meant 
that tribal leaders gained de-facto rights to taxation, to policing public order 
and to appointing governors and judges during the war Many of these de-facto 
rights were enshrined in law after the end of the conflict. Thus, it appears that 
decentralising control over taxation to buy loyalty of violence specialists in 
this case contributed to the withering of central institutions not only for 
taxation, but also for other aspects of administration (Stookey, 1978, p. 259; 
compare also: Rogers, forthcoming). 
 Conversely, seeking to centralise control over revenue is likely to 
increase bureaucratic penetration and generate (selective) bureaucratic 
strength. Measures to centralise control over revenues in this way include 
taxation and other forms of enforced direct transfer of capital through com-
pulsory savings schemes, which have historically been equally or more impor-
tant (Di John, 2010a). On the whole, these are measures that require centrali-
sation, rule-bound behaviour, and, because they are reliant on at least the 
passive acquiescence of important portions of the population, require bar-
gaining and imply direct linkages between state officials and the broader 
population (Levi, 1988). 
 An example may serve to illustrate this point. During the ‘Malay Emer-
gency’ during the 1950s, the civil-war created conditions in which an elite 
coalition, fearing insurgent victory, acquiesced to a thorough reform of the tax 
system and higher export duties, leading to a significant increase in central 
government revenue. As the relative income of the central government began 
to eclipse that of the federal states and local power holders, central institu-
tions gained not only powers of patronage, but also took over more adminis-
trative duties (Stubbs, 1997, pp. 60–62).
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financing and de-institutionalisation made 
in this literature may be based on too ge-
nerous an extrapolation from a small num-
ber of cases of civil war in Sub-Saharan 
African during the 1990s (Di John, 2010b, 
pp. 20–22).
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 However, the specific impact of taxation strategies will depend on the 
detail of their actual implementation, rather than broad generalisations. 
Whether tax is collected from all parts of the territory, whether there are other 
actors with the right or ability to tax, and whether taxation requires bargains 
with large numbers of economic actors or is purely rent-based is likely to 
temper the straightforward equation of taxation and bureaucratic strength 
and penetration (Di John, 2010a) and determines its extent and selective 
strengths and weaknesses. 
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Summary and Caveats
The foregoing sections argued that the centrality of violence, particularly 
internal violence, for the establishment and reproduction of political orders 
and especially state-formation has not been taken seriously enough and as a 
result civil war has been identified with state collapse and unmaking, where 
its impact is likely to be far more complex and contingent. Building on the 
questions highlighted by this conceptual shift, the paper presented two 
interconnected processes, each linking a set of shared conditions common to 
civil war to one of the two areas of state formation identified in section 2. 
 Gleaned from a literature whose primary concern has not generally been 
drawing out the connection between the dynamics of civil war and outcomes 
in terms of state formation, the processes presented may provide a useful 
starting point for both further academic inquiry and for focusing policy analy-
sis and assessment of potential conflict outcomes in terms of state formation.
 Presenting in relatively simple, abstracted form the complex set of 
linkages between civil war and outcomes in terms of shifting political settle-
ments and institutions on the basis of just three widely-shared features of 
civil war, the processes constructed here serve to highlight the small number 
of decision points at which (constrained) choices by dominant coalitions and 
challengers set-off chains of causality fundamentally shaping the character of 
the state that emerges from and through civil war. 
 It has hopefully been made clear throughout that the paper does not 
assume a simple determinism. Neither are the eventual consequences neces-
sarily intended by the actors making the choices, nor do the same choices in 
different contexts necessarily lead to the same or even similar outcomes, as 
the presentation of rival potential pathways has made clear. Part of the utility 
of the presented processes may be that they highlight pathways that are 
ambivalent, moments where competing pressures exist, and that they serve to 
underscore the broad range of potential outcomes, encompassing significant 
narrowing or broadening of the dominant coalition, the relative ascendancy of 
actors in control of coercion or capital within it, and a range of institutional 
outcomes ranging from stronger and more centralised coercive and non-coer-
cive institutions to fragmentation of political power and the establishment of 
more localised coalitions and institutions. 
 Similarly, in presenting a set of general linkages, the processes pre-
sented here necessarily abstract from the specificities of domestic institu-
tions, historical rivalries, and time- and place-bound types of knowledge, 
while attempting to hint at the ways in which they may shape outcomes and 
which pathways are active in any given context. Likewise, some potential 
pathways are without doubt left unconsidered. Not least among these is the 
whole complex of state-centred identities that have been at the forefront of 
nationalist projects around the globe. Analysts and practitioners who share 
Kahlevi Holsti’s view that “it is in the realm of ideas and sentiment that the 
fates of states is primarily determined” (1996, p. 84), will judge this to be a 
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major lacuna. But ideas of the state and political loyalty are intimately cou-
pled with the political economy and means of coercion and in many ways 
appear to be dependent on them (compare e.g. the evidence around political 
alignment and alliance in Kalyvas, 2006). Moreover, it is an area in which 
potential mechanisms remain far less specified and are perhaps fundamen-
tally more ambivalent. 
 As such, the processes presented here purport to offer an initial step in 
highlighting potential connections. Further research is necessary to explore 
and further specify the conditions under which different pathways are acti-
vated. The above processes can provide the framework for such further 
exploration, while likewise providing a tool for policy analysis to help systema-
tise thinking about the implications of ongoing and historical conflicts for 
state formation.
Summary and Caveats
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